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Commentary
Applying Due Process
To Gag Rules and Orders
ABA Recommended Court Procedure to Accommodate
Rights of Fair Trial and Free Press.'
I. INTRODUCTION
At its 1976 annual meeting held in August, the ABA House of
Delegates recommended a new court procedure for the application
of due process to the issuance of gag orders. 2 The proposal seeks to
render standing gag rules unenforceable and would provide for
special gag orders only after notice and an opportunity for a hearing
are given to interested parties. The ABA proposal will help to
reduce the current glut of judicial restraints by providing more
specific procedural guidance than was offered by the Supreme
Court in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart.3
1. ABA LEGAL ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss, REVISED
DRAFT RECOMMENDED COURT PROCEDURE TO ACCOMMODATE RIGHTS OF
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Nov. 1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA
PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS].
2. The ABA Legal Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press,
which is subject to the Standing Committee on Communications,
studied the possibility of standard court procedures for the issuance
and enforcement of restrictive orders. The Committee consisted of
two judges, three practicing attorneys, and two media representatives.
In addition, at the 1974 ABA annual meeting, the opinions of judges,
lawyers, laymen, and new media personnel were solicited. Id. at 3-4.
3. 44 U.S.L.W. 5149 (U.S. June 30, 1976). The Supreme Court limited
its decision to the facts of the Simants' case in finding that a restraint
on media comment was not justified.
Jack C. Landau, Supreme Court reporter for Newhouse News Serv-
ice initiated the ABA proposal. As a representative of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press at the 1974 ABA midyear meeting
and later at the 1974 ABA annual meeting in Honolulu, he suggested
that procedural due process be available to all those affected by the
issuance of restrictive judicial orders.
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This article will first explore the structure of the ABA proposal
and how it could improve the current system of judicial restraints
by reducing unneeded gag orders, preserving first amendment
freedoms of speech and press without the expense and delay of
traditional court procedures, and eliminating the hidden jeopardy
of standing gag rules. It will then examine the two pressing issues
left unsolved: When does the Constitution allow a judge to gag a
journalist, lawyer, or other individual interested in a trial? Should
one who violates an improper or erroneous order be punished?
It will be concluded that the ABA proposal approved by the
House of Delegates may be a long overdue improvement in the
area of judicial restraints. 4 However, the House of Delegates could
have strengthened the proposal by expressing an opinion on the
constitutional standards which should apply to the issuance of gag
orders, and by recommending that those who violate erroneous
court orders not be punished.
II. STRUCTURE OF THE PROPOSAL
The ABA proposal entails a "standing guidelines-special or-
der approach" to court action.5 It recommends that courts adopt
standing guidelines for the conduct of reporters, 6 attorneys, law
enforcement officers, judges and judicial employees in regard to
the release of information at the pretrial and trial stages of criminal
litigation. The new guidelines would replace old standing gag
rules and would not be enforceable by contempt proceedings.
Special orders would be entered by a court only if it found that
"under applicable constitutional standards"7 there was sufficient
danger that prejudicial publicity would prevent a fair trial. The
orders would be tailored to the circumstances of the individual case
and violations would be punished as contempt.8
4. Prior to the new ABA proposal, the media and bar attempted to re-
solve their differences through "voluntary agreements." See ABA
FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS (1974).
5. ABA PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS, supra note 1, at 6-7.
6. The proposal suggests that the procedures outlined are "directed pri-
marily to lawyers, court and law enforcement personnel and not to
the press." Id. at 1. However, the proposal was prompted by com-
plaints from the media. See note 3 supra. Therefore, the ABA's dis-
claimer is most likely a response to journalists' charges that the pro-
posal does not provide enough protection for the rights of the media.
7. ABA PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS, supra note 1, at 10.
8. For support of restrictive orders applied to the press, see Hornstein,
Gag Order on Press Justified by 'Irresponsible' Crime News Reporting,
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Due process would be afforded by a court to interested parties
before it adopted standing guidelines and special orders. Be-
fore adopting standing guidelines, it would be required to solicit
the written and oral opinions of news media, bar organizations, law
enforcement agencies, public defenders and prosecutors. The
guidelines also would be subject to periodic review and change.
Before issuing a special order, a court would have to determine
whether sufficient danger of prejudicial publicity existed; then it
would draft a proposed order, give notice to the parties affected
and provide them with a hearing. A final special order would be
detailed and specific and would list reasons for its issuance.
In "extraordinary circumstances" a court could enter a tempo-
rary special order which would be enforceable before the require-
ments of a hearing had been met. The court would explain the
necessity for the temporary special order and would provide a
prompt hearing to consider continuing, modifying or terminating
the order. All those aggrieved by the order would be able to
appeal in the most prompt manner provided in the jurisdiction for
contesting other court orders, such as injunctionsY
The structure of the ABA proposal shows promise of improv-
ing the present system of judicial restraints in three major respects.
First, the use of due process standards may prevent the issu-
ance of unnecessary gag orders.' 0 Accelerating numbers of re-
strictive orders have been issued to lawyers and reporters in the last
decade.'1 Since the Supreme Court decided in 1966 that the duty
of insulating a trial from excessive publicity rested with the trial
Omaha World-Herald, Dec. 3, 1975, at 6, col. 1; Califano, Persecuting
Patty Hearst, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 3, 1975, at 13 (containing the views
of Catherine Hearst); Greenberg, Court Gag Rule? Tush, It's 'Discre-
tion', Lincoln Journal, Nov. 11, 1975, at 5, col. 2, (wherein Chief Justice
Warren Burger is quoted as saying: "The Constitution merely says
'Congress shall make no law,' it does not mean a court cannot use dis-
cretion in a trial.").
9. See ABA PROPOSAL FOR JuDIcLr RESTRAINTS, supra note 1, at 6-10 for
an outline of the structure of the proposal.
10. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press contends by way
of a 1972 survey that in no single case litigated by the media was a
gag order upheld on its merits. See Landau, The Challenge of the
Communications Media, 62 A.B.A.J. 55, 59 (1976).
11. The Reporters Committee cites 174 cases involving restrictive orders
since 1966:
Following is a breakdown of orders . . . litigated and unliti-
gated, which have in some way restricted access to or com-
ment about the judicial process .... Cases are listed only
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court judge,1 2 the United States Judicial Conference 13 and the
ABA1 4 each have proposed barring comments by attorneys and
other court officers which were "reasonably likely" to interfere with
the fair administration of justice. However, individual courts have
gone far beyond the Supreme Court decision and the Judicial
Conference and ABA proposals of the late 1960s and have gagged
members of the media, sometimes without even a pretext of a clear
and present danger to the trial.15 If those who will be affected are
given notice of the planned restrictive order, an opportunity to
refute the need for the order, and an expedited appeal of the court
decision, fewer unjustified judicial restraints will be imposed.
If an erroneous restraint is imposed, at least its duration should be
once, although the order might fall into more than one cate-
gory.
0 9,
2o ooz
Oo0' ..o0
-ua" P. 0> - l 0 .a
1967 1 2 0 2
1968 5 7 1 0
1969 1 4 1 0
1970 0 7 0 1
1971 5 6 2 1
1972 4 1 4 1
1973 8 7 4 0
1974 12 11 13 1
1975 25 18 14 5
61 63 39 11
Id. at 57.
12. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
13. The Judicial Conference Recommendations were drafted in 1968 by
twelve federal court judges, with Judge Irving R. Kaufman as chair-
man, and are often referred to as the "Kaufman Report." See 45
F.R.D. 391, 404 (1968).
14. The ABA proposals, incorporated into the ABA Canons in 1968, are
often referred to as the "Reardon Report," since Paul C. Reardon was
the committee chairman. See ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL
AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS ,RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS,
APPROVED DRAFT (1968).
15. Last October, Nebraska's Lincoln County Judge Ronald Ruff issued
a no-comment order restricting statements of attorneys, public offi-
cials, witnesses, and the press involved in the Erwin Charles Simants
murder trial. He stated that a dominant factor in his decision was
a "reasonable likelihood" that publicity would make the impaneling
of a jury "difficult if not impossible." Lincoln Journal, Oct. 22, 1975,
at '57, col. 1.
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shorter than under the present system. By dispensing with the
lower court hearing prior to the issuance of the gag order, those
contesting the order need only wait through an "expedited" appeal
to have the restraint removed.
Second,. the ABA proposal's use of due process would not
offend the first amendment freedoms of speech and press as grave-
ly as does the current use of no-notice prior restraints, and yet
would not be as expensive as other alternatives to the present
system. Those who consider free speech and press most sacred
contend that traditional court procedures should be used to pre-
serve fair trials.16 They note that changes in venue, careful voir
dire, continuances, sequestration, court instructions, declarations of
mistrial and provisions for new trials could ensure fairness with few
constraints on publicity. The cost of this method in terms of time
and money would be far greater than the expense of providing due
process for those who will be affected by gag orders.
Third, the uncertainty of the current system should be rectified
by the "standing guidelines-special order approach" of the ABA
proposal. Presently, most state and federal courts operate under a
system of standing rules and special orders which regulate trial
publicity.17 Violations of standing rules, as well as special orders,
can be deemed as contempt; however, the standing rules have not
been enforced uniformly.' 8 A judge may see no reason to enforce
a court rule limiting publicity if a case is not sensational. There-
fore, those wishing to disseminate information about a trial have
been unsure of the legal parameters regulating their speech in the
absence of individual gag orders. Under the new ABA proposal,
no one will be held in contempt for violating standing guidelines,
and special orders will be tailored to the specific circumstances of
the individual case.
III. PROBLEMS LEFT UNSOLVED
The new ABA proposal is structured to allow the imposition of
restrictive orders only when "applicable constitutional standards"
16. In both Sheppard v. Maxwell and Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart the
Supreme Court listed several traditional court procedures for limiting
the effects of trial publicity.
For arguments against gag orders directed at the media, see Annot.,
5 A.L.R. Fed. 948 (1970); C. BUSH, FREE PREss AND FAIR TRIAL (1970);
Comment, The Gag Order, Exclusion and the Press's Right to Inforyma-
tion, 39 ALBANy L. REV. 317 (1975); Comment, The Gag Order, 45 S.
CALiF. L. REV. 51 (1972).
17. Eighty of the ninety-four federal district courts have standing court
rules limiting trial publicity by penalty of contempt citation. D. NEB.
R. 37A limits trial publicity by attorneys and court officers. Viola-
tions are punishable through contempt citations.
18. ABA PROPoSAL FOR JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS, supra note 1, at 5.
432 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 3 (1976)
indicate a sufficient danger of prejudicial publicity. Yet it is unclear
what standards are applicable to members of the media or to attor-
neys and court officers. The proposal also provides for an appeal
of orders "in the most expeditious manner provided by the particu-
lar jurisdiction for review of temporary injunctive orders or any
other orders which are subject to expedited review."'19 But, if
those affected by an erroneous order violate its provisions pending
appeal, they still may be guilty of contempt.
A. What Constitutional Standards Apply?
The Constitution provides protection against the possible abuse
of power by judges, 20 but does not contemplate the awesome
effects of joint action by attorneys and journalists during trial
proceedings. During the early 1960s, much attention was drawn
to the actions of the worst among lawyers and journalists. 21 Such
misconduct culminated in the 1966 Supreme Court decision of
Sheppard v. Maxwell.22 Dr. Sam Sheppard, accused of murder-
ing his wife in 1954, was questioned and tried in an atmosphere
the Supreme Court described as "bedlam. ' 21 The Court held that
publicity of the trial was so extensive and untempered that Shep-
pard's conviction could not stand.24 Recognizing the vital role of
the free press in the administration of justice, the Court did not
impose rigid rules on judges, attorneys or the media,25 but it did
suggest that the media's sources of information, such as attorneys,
parties, witnesses and court officers, should be restrained from
publicizing a case before any direct restraints were placed on
journalists themselves. 26  The Court laid the duty of insulating a
trial and ensuring fairness with the trial court judge.2 7
19. Id. at 11.
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which ensures the defendant in a criminal
case the right to a public trial and the 'assistance of counsel. In Penne-
kamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), the Supreme Court declared that
a judge could not use the power of contempt to insulate himself from
criticism.
21. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINA-
TION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY 240 (1964).
22. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
23. Id. at 355.
24. Id. at 350.
25. Id. at 358-59.
26. Id. at 363.
27. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that
will protect their processes from prejudicial outside inter-
ferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for the defense, the
accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers com-
ing under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted
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Therefore, with the Sheppard case, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the Constitution to apply a dual standard to prejudicial
courtroom publicity, distinguishing comments made by attorneys
from those made by the media. Statements by journalists were sub-
ject to the clear and present danger standard s and could not be
curbed unless they posed a serious and imminent threat to a fair
trial.2 9 However, a more stoic demeanor was required of attorneys.
Faced with their newly-emphasized responsibility, trial court
judges constitutionally could do little more to constrain members of
the media than require that they conduct themselves properly in the
courtroom.30 Therefore, initially, most judicial effort was aimed at
restricting the comments made by lawyers at various stages of civil
and criminal proceedings, and thereby limiting the media's sources
of fact, and perhaps fiction.
The judicial restrictions on lawyers took the form of both
individual gag orders and standing court rules. Violation of either
could result in contempt of court citations. The text of many
standing court rules was a verbatim adoption of the 1968 proposal
of the United States Judicial Conference.3 1 It generally prohibited
lawyers from releasing information about pending or imminent
criminal litigation if there was a "reasonable likelihood" that the
information would interefere with the administration of justice.3 2
to frustrate its function. Collaboration between counsel and
the press as to information affecting the fairness of a crim-
inal trial is not only subject to regulation, but it is highly
censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.
Id.
"More specifically, the trial court might well have proscribed extra-
judicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official
which divulged prejudicial matters." Id. at 361.
28. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941).
29. In Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 384 (1947), the Court set out its test
for when trial publicity may be curbed: "The fires which the expres-
sion kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat
to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or
even probable; it must immediately imperiL"
30. 384 U.S. at 358-59. The Court recommended limiting the number of
reporters allowed in the courtroom, seating them outside the bar, and
prohibiting them from handling the exhibits. It suggested that the
media's conduct outside the courtroom could be controlled through re-
strictions on the statements of police, witnesses, and counsel. The
Court did not suggest direct restrictions on the media's rights of speech
or publication.
31. 45 F.R.D. at 404.
32. The Judicial Conference proposal prohibited counsel's disseminating
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The 1968 "Reardon Report" of the ABA, resulting in Canon DR
7-107 (A-D), 33 also banned public statements "reasonably likely
to interfere with a fair trial" during and after the time of jury
selection. DR 7-107(G) placed the same restriction on lawyers'
comments "reasonably likely" to interfere with the fair trial of a
civil action.
Not all judges have agreed that attorneys and other court
officers should have a more limited right of free speech than
members of the media. Some have "solved" this double standard
by issuing gag orders to the press when its comments pose only a
"reasonable likelihood" of interfering with justice,34 but the Su-
preme Court has never sanctioned such a standard.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
chose to remedy the double standard in another way. In 1974, in
the case of Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer3 5 the Council of
Lawyers sought a court declaration that a local district court rule,
modeled after the Judicial Conference recommendations and DR
7-107 was unconstitutional.30 The court of appeals determined
that the "reasonable likelihood" test for the no-comment rules must
be replaced3 7 and that comments by attorneys and court officers
specific information, including criminal records, confessions, examina-
tions, or pleas of the accused; identity, testimony, or credibility of pro-
spective witnesses; and opinions as to the merits of or evidence in the
case. It -also barred counsel's dissemination of information if "there
is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with
a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice."
Id.
33. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics DR 7-107 (A-D) placed the
same specific restrictions on attorneys' comments as did the Judicial
Conference recommendations.
34. See notes 11 and 16 supra. The increasing volume of judicial re-
straints issued in the last ten years indicates a change in the standard
used by judges to determine when a threat exists, rather than in the
nature of trials themselves.
35. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
rev'd, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
36. N.D. ILL. R. 1.07 is a verbatim adoption of the Judicial Conference rec-
ommendations. 45 F.R.D. at 404.
37. An individual, judge-made gag order was challenged in the Seventh
Circuit in 1970. The district court order prohibiting defendants and
their attorneys from making statements pending a criminal trial was
overturned by the court of appeals which held that the order was over-
broad, because there was no "clear and present danger of a serious
and imminent threat, or a likelihood of such a threat" to the fair ad-
ministration of justice. Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
A year later, the Seventh Circuit affirmed this stance by declaring
overbroad a prohibition against all extrajudicial comment by counsel
in a pending case, even though violators were not held in contempt.
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were not to be restrained unless they posed a clear and present
danger of a "serious and imminent threat" to justice.3 8  The court
recognized that the discussion of some specific topics listed in the
no-comment rules presumptively could be considered as a serious
and imminent threat to a fair trial.3 9
By stating that restrictive orders should be imposed only when
"applicable constitutional standards" indicate a sufficient danger of
prejudicial publicity, the new ABA proposal suggests no answer to
the basic query of what standards are applicable to the particular
case. The question still remains whether the press should be
restricted only when a clear and present danger of a threat to
justice exists, while attorneys are gagged whenever a reasonable
likelihood of such a threat appears, or whether the same right to
free speech applies to both.
Those who formulated the new ABA proposal were not un-
mindful of this problem. The first draft 40 stated that "Special
Orders, punishable by contempt shall be entered only in particular
cases where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial publici-
ty will prevent a fair trial."' 41 On August 7, 1975, three days after
the Seventh Circuit ruled on Bauer, the ABA annual convention in
Montreal received this first draft. By November, the proposal was
revised to provide for the use of "applicable constitutional stan-
dards" rather than the reasonable likelihood test.42
Although the ABA may not be able to interpret the Constitu-
tion as it choses, it should take a more definite stance in this
important debate.43  By providing that "applicable constitutional
In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971). These two cases tempered
the impact of individual gag orders and court policy statements by
insisting that the "serious and imminent threat" test, which had been
applicable to press gag orders for nearly thirty years, be applied to
gag orders and policy statements directed at counsel.
38. 522 F.2d at 249.
39. Id. at 251.
40. ABA ADVISORY Covmf. ON FAIR TRIAL AiD FREE PRESS, PRmnNARY
DAFT PROPOSED COURT PROCEDURE FOR FAIR TRLAL-FREE PRESS JUDIcIAL
REsTRicTIV ORDERS (July, 1975).
41. Id. at 8.
42. See Roney, The Bar Answers the Challenge, 62 A.B.A.J. 60 (1976).
43. Judge Paul H. Roney, who served as chairman of the ABA Legal Ad-
visory Committee on Fair Trial -and Free Press that drafted the new
proposal, contends that "the committee deems controversies over sub-
stantive matters irrelevant to a consideration of the proposed proce-
dure." Id. at 61. By making no recommendations on "substantive
matters" the committee may expect the proposal to pass the House
of Delegates more easily and to be received better by judges of di-
verse views.
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standards" shall govern the issuance of gag orders, the ABA
merely defers resolution of this issue to trial court judges. 4 4 Dur-
ing the past ten years, these judges have usually interpreted the first
amendment as providing little protection to either attorneys or
journalists.45
B. Should a Violation of an Erroneous Order Be Punished?
In England, before the formation of the Star Chamber, a
person who impaired the fair proceeding of a civil or criminal trial,
by excessive publicity or otherwise, could be indicted for the crime
of contempt of court.46 He was allowed all the due process
protections afforded any other crime, including trial by jury. In
the early seventeenth century, the Star Chamber assumed jurisdic-
tion to punish these contempts, and after its abolition in 1641,
ordinary judges began trying the contempts summarily. When this
procedure was challenged in 1765, the practice was upheld.47 Since
that date, the summary method has continued, in both England
and the United States.48
In Nebraska, as in most states, 49 once an order is imposed by a
judge, in-court violations can result in conviction for contempt
44. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, the Supreme Court recognized that
the question of a dual standard for expression by attorneys and by
newsmen exists. However, the facts of the case did not allow the Court
to resolve that question. 44 U.S.L.W. at 5157 n.8.
Some judges contend that the difference between a "clear and
present danger" and a "reasonable likelihood" of such a danger is a
semantic one. See 522 F.2d at 621 (Castle, J., dissenting in part).
45. See note 11 supra.
46. H. STREET, FREEDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAW 154 (3rd ed. 1972).
47. R. v. Almon, 97 Eng. Rep. 94 (1765).
48. American courts, however, have been more permissive toward journal-
ists than have the courts in England. English law professor Harry
Street has noted:
In the United States, the Press is free to assist in detection
of crime, to interview witnesses and suspects and report their
observations, to comment on trials as they proceed, and to
give opinions on the guilt of suspects. Englishmen should be
proud of the fact that none of these things can happen in
England: the law of contempt stands in the way.
STREET, supra note 47, at 155.
See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263-65 (1941), for an
historical summary of judicial attitudes toward trial publicity. In
Bridges, the Court recognized that the Constitution mandates tolerance
of journalistic comment which poses no clear and present danger to
a fair trial. This degree of tolerance was never required in England.
49. In most states, summary procedures are used to convict for an in-court
contempt. For out-of-court contempts, however, a fact-finding pro-
ceeding may be used, though the accused cannot exonerate himself by
showing the court order to be improper or erroneous. See Walker v.
GAG RULES
through the use of summary proceedings, 50 while out-of-court
violations can lead to conviction for contempt following a fact-
finding trial. 51 Even though a rule or order may have been
imposed improperly or erroneously, a violation is still subject to
contempt conviction.52
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
the case of In re Oliver,53 took a pioneering step in this area as it did
in Bauer. In 1971, an attorney challenged a standing court policy
statement which prohibited all extra-judicial comment by counsel
in a pending case. He did this following his reprimand for having
violated the policy statement. The court of appeals determined
that the statement was overbroad, and, therefore, any punishment
imposed for violating it was void. It noted that when a court
adopts broad rules, it acts like a legislature; 54 therefore, one who
had violated a rule of a court could challenge the validity of the
rule itself, and if successful, could exonerate himself.55 However,
this decision was limited to standing court rules and policies and
did not apply to specific court orders.
In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit was faced with the problem of an allegedly invalid special
court order in the case of United States v. Dickinson.5 6 It ruled
that the gag order, which was issued without due process and
which barred the publication of court proceedings, must be obeyed
pending appeal. Although the court noted that the order could
not withstand the slightest breeze emanating from the first amend-
ment, 7 it still insisted that the press must obey the invalid prior
restraint and appeal its issuance, or face contempt conviction.58
Under the Dickinson rule, if a judge erroneously restrains the
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948);
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Howat v.
Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418 (1911); and In re Savin, 131 U.S. 269 (1889). But see
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 5-16 (1945); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1937).
50. Nas. REV. STAT. § 25-2122 (Reissue 1975).
51. Id.
52. Jenkins v. State, 59 Neb. 68, 80 N.W. 268 (1899), affd 60 Neb. 205,
82 N.W. 622 (1900). However, if the accused can prove that the court
order is void for lack of jurisdiction, he may escape penalty. McFar-
land v. State, 172 Neb. 251, 104 N.W.2d 307 (1961).
53. 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971).
54. Id. at 113-14.
55. Id. at 114.
56. 465 F.2d 496 (Sth Cir. 1972).
57. Id. at 509.
58. Id. at 509-10.
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publication of any trial information, attorneys and journalists must
abide by the unconstitutional court order until an appellate deci-
sion is in effect. Otherwise, they must go to jail.5 9
While the new ABA proposal wisely avoids the possibility that
violations of standing court rules will be punishable by contempt
proceedings, one who violates a gag order which is overturned on
appeal as erroneous will still be guilty of contempt. The use of a
temporary special order, issued without due process in "extraordi-
nary circumstances," could lengthen the time that attorneys and the
media may be subject to the terms of an erroneous order.
If one who is accused of violating a law can prove that it is
invalid, he will be exonerated. This fundamental rule should not
be altered simply because a judge issues orders in an "adjudicative
role." If the order is invalid, the individual who has violated it
should not be punished. Under this theory, attorneys and journal-
ists would not act hastily to violate court orders, because they would
be punished if the order were upheld.
The ABA should have recognized that prior restraints on free
expression are presumptively invalid 0 and that the judge who is-
sues a gag order should have the burden of proving its validity.
If the ABA cannot recommend a stay on appeal for all restrictive
orders, it should at least advocate an end to punishment for those
who violate invalid court orders.
IV. CONCLUSION
The carnival-like trials of the early 1960s demonstrated that
some restraints are needed to insulate court proceedings from
excessive publicity. Ideally, the new ABA proposal could help to
59. Landau has noted that when a no-notice gag order is imposed on the
press, a reporter has four choices:
(1) The reporter may appeal the constitutionality of the order
while the case is going forward, be unconstitutionally cen-
sored, and risk a substantial probability that the appeal will be
moot before finally decided. (2) The reporter may break
the order and, under Dickinson go to jail, even if the order is
void. (3) The reporter may knowingly conspire with someone
covered by the order . . . to give him information . .. there-
by subjecting both [himself] and the named source to con-
tempt. (4) The reporter may interview a [source] covered
by the order, thereby subjecting himself to the threat of con-
tempt if he refuses to reveal this "source ....
Landau, supra note 11, at 58-59.
60. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organ-
ization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931).
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eliminate the issuance of unnecessary gag orders by offering due
process to those who may be affected by the restraints. It could
help to preserve first amendment freedoms of speech and press
without the expense and delay of resorting to traditional court
procedures such as continuances and retrials. Finally, it could
eliminate the hidden jeopardy of the present system by removing
sanctions for the violation of standing court gag rules.
However, the proposal leaves one issue in confusion and anoth-
er steeped in injustice. Because the nation's judges are free to
reject all or any part of a recommendation by the bar, the ABA has
no reason to refuse to express an opinion on these two issues.
The ABA should define the constitutional standards which it be-
lieves apply to attorneys and journalists whose speech is to be re-
strained by a court order. It also should make a clear recommen-
dation as to whether attorneys and journalists who violate erro-
neous court orders should be punished. The way courts approach
these two substantive issues will largely determine the success of
the ABA's procedural proposal.
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